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Minimum Wages, Labor Market Institutions, and Female 
Employment and Unemployment: A Cross-Country Analysis 
 
This paper estimates the effect of minimum wage regulation in 16 OECD countries, 1970-
2008. Our treatment is motivated by Neumark and Wascher’s (2004) seminal cross-country 
study using panel methods to estimate minimum wage effects among teenagers and young 
adults. Apart from the longer time interval examined here, a major departure of the present 
study is the focus on prime-age females, a group typically neglected in the component 
minimum wage literature. Another is our deployment of time-varying policy and institutional 
regressors. Yet another is our examination of unemployment and participation outcomes in 
addition to employment effects. We report strong evidence of adverse employment effects 
among adult females and lower participation, even if the unemployment effects are muted. 
Although we report some similar findings to Neumark and Wascher as to the role of labor 
market institutions and policies, we do not observe the same patterns in the institutional data; 
in particular, we can reject for our target group their finding of stronger disemployment effects 
in countries with the least regulated markets. 
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There is comparatively little cross-country evidence on the effects of minimum wages on 
employment. This contrasts with the truly enormous literature on minimum wages. What 
evidence we have is contained in just two main studies: an early Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) study (1998) looking at the effect of minimum wages on 
the employment-population ratio of both teenagers and young persons (as well as adults) for a 
sample of  7(9) OECD countries, 1975-1996, and Neumark and Wascher’s (2004) expanded 
analysis in this Review of 17 OECD nations, 1975-2000, focusing on teenagers and young adults 
(aged 15 to 24 years) but again looking at the employment-population ratio.  
  By contrast, the parallel and burgeoning literature on employment protection is largely 
rooted in cross-country comparisons. And importantly Neumark and Wascher’s minimum wage 
study draws heavily on supplementary arguments from this literature that might be expected 
either to amplify or moderate the employment consequences of minimum wages (on which more 
below).
1 Unlike that literature, however, it does not share the same breadth of outcome indicator, 
focusing as we have noted on disemployment via the employment-population ratio and 
eschewing consideration of unemployment, labor-force participation, and other indicators (e.g. 
hours). 
In the present treatment, while further updating the period of analysis, we also seek to 
link the minimum wage and employment protection literatures. But our target group differs 
critically from that traditionally examined in the two literatures and especially the minimum 
wage literature. That is, we will look at the labor market effects of minimum wages on workers 
other than teenagers and youths that are also at risk from wage minima, namely females aged 25 
to 54 years. To the extent that this group of prime-age females includes low-productivity labor – 
reflecting their historically lower human capital accumulation due to interruptions in labor 
market experience and more limited access to education and training – the bite of minimum 
wages can also be expected to be material, and presumably more so in developing nations 
(Ozturk, 2006). The impact of minimum wages may be underscored by the higher-valued outside 
options of females, which in turn suggests that a wider range of outcomes other than 
disemployment be considered, to include participation. Furthermore, the existence of youth 
subminima that have been found to ameliorate the adverse consequences of minimum wages 
among that target group might be expected to have just the opposite effect among adult females.    3
‘Policy complementarities’ invoked by the wider literature are also examined. In 
particular, we examine all the labor market institutions considered by Neumark and Wascher 
(2004) in their innovative analysis. As an additional refinement, we introduce a time-varying 
measure of the key employment protection argument. Indeed, most of our variables are time-
varying with the exception of labor standards and the variables identifying the process in which 
minimum wages are set.
2    
 
Previous Research 
As mentioned earlier, despite the massive amount of research on the employment and 
other consequences of minimum wages (see Neumark and Wascher, 2007) there is scant cross-
country analysis exploiting the tremendous variation in minimum wages by nation state.
3 As 
further noted, the two principal analyses using panel data for industrialized nations are those of 
the OECD (1998) and Card and Neumark (2004). 
The OECD study looks at the effect of minimum wages on the employment of teenagers, 
young adults, and prime-age adults for a small sample of countries, 1975-1996.
4 The countries 
are Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United 
States. However, for the gender analysis, the sample is reduced to seven counties because of the 
lack of adequate series of average wages for Portugal and Spain. 
The regressions follow the state-level panel data specifications now standard in the U.S. 
minimum wage literature. The dependent variable for the full sample was the employment-
population ratio for teenagers aged 15 to 19 years, youths aged 20 to 24 years, and adults aged 25 
to 54 years. For the reduced seven-country sample, separate male and female subsamples of each 
group were used. The key minimum wage ratio was calculated separately for each group using 
the relevant average wage and allowing for youth rates where applicable. The employment 
population ratio was regressed on the ratio of minimum to median wages with controls for the 
business cycle (the prime-age male unemployment rate and/or the output gap), different 
institutional features (not including employment protection), country trend effects, and fixed 
country effects.  
It was found that increases in the minimum wage measure had a negative impact on 
teenage employment across all specifications (albeit in some instances attendant upon the 
exclusion of Portugal and Spain). For the full (partial) sample of countries, in the authors’   4
preferred specifications – with corrections for first-order autocorrelation for the error terms and 
heteroscedasticity across countries – a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage was associated 
with a fall in teenage employment of between 1.5 and 2 (2.7 and 4.1) percent. On the other hand, 
for young adults aged 20 to 24 years and for adult prime age males and females the elasticities 
were seldom statistically significant.
5  
The OECD analysis does not consider the role of labor market institutions/policies other 
than union density, the unemployment insurance (UI) replacement rate, and non-wage labor costs 
as a proportion of total costs/the tax wedge – and it does not report the respective coefficient 
estimates, merely a summary of the estimated employment elasticities (a sample of which are 
given above). But, as is well known, empirical analysis of the consequences of employment 
protection in particular has mushroomed since Lazear’s (1990) pioneering study. Other 
institutions examined in addition to employment protection have included active labor market 
policies, coordination in collective bargaining, and labor standards (e.g. Scarpetta 1996; Nickell 
and Layard 1999). More recent developments have included potential interactions between 
institutions and between institutions and economic shocks (e.g. Addison and Teixeira 2003; 
Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel 2005).
6  And yet more recent innovations have included the role of 
product market and business regulation, size of government, quality of industrial relations, and 
even religion. Unlike the minimum wage literature, most such analyses have focused on cross-
country differences.  
The study by Neumark and Wascher (2004) is notable in attempting to bridge the gap 
between these two literatures, even if minimum wages have sometimes figured in the armory of 
labor market policies investigated in aggregate. Specifically, Neumark and Wascher investigate 
the effect of minimum wages on teenage and youth employment – again, the employment-
population ratio – for seventeen countries over the (maximum) sample period 1976-2000. These 
countries include, in addition to those examined by the OECD (1998), Italy, Australia, Germany, 
Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. 
The dependent variable is the employment-population ratio for the group concerned, 
although the minimum wage argument – the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage – 
uses the adult minimum wage in the numerator and the all-worker average in the denominator 
workers.  Neumark and Wascher’s basic equation regresses the employment measure on a one-
year lag of the minimum-to-average-wage ratio plus aggregate labor market and demographic   5
controls. The authors provide results for a simple OLS specification, fixed effect models with 
and without controls for year effects and time trends, and a dynamic version of the model via the 
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable and estimated using the GMM technique. In all cases, 
including the latter, they obtain well-determined negative coefficient estimates for the minimum 
wage variable. The estimated minimum wage elasticities range from -0.13 to -0.28 for young 
adults and from -0.09 to -0.31 in the case of teenagers.   
The authors then augment their basic estimating equations with variables representing (a) 
characteristics of the minimum wage system, and (b) other labor market policies and institutions. 
Under (a) they consider the role of a bargained minimum wage (the omitted category is statutory 
minimum wage determination), a system with subnational wage minima, and a system with 
youth subminima. Abstracting from the independent effects of the different types of minimum 
wage machinery and focusing on the interaction terms from the authors’ fixed effect and GMM 
specifications, it is reported that bargained minima are associated with a smaller negative 
employment impact of minimum wages and conversely where there are industry or geographic 
wage floors. As expected, youth subminima reduce the adverse effects of minimum wages on 
young persons’ employment, especially in the case of teenagers. 
Under (b) the institutions considered are labor standards, employment protection, active 
labor market policies, the unemployment insurance (UI) replacement rate, and union density.
7 
Again focusing on results from the preferred fixed effect and GMM specifications, the authors 
find evidence of certain complementarities. Thus, more restrictive labor standards and higher 
union density tend to exacerbate the disemployment effects of minimum wages, while stricter 
employment protection and active labor market policies appear to have the opposite effect. Of 
the institutional variables, only UI replacement rates appear to bear no relation to minimum 
wages – even if their independent effect is seemingly to reduce employment. 
In a final application, Neumark and Wascher seek to erect a typology of minimum wage 
countries and investigate their component minimum wage elasticities. The categories are 
fourfold: high employment protection/active labor market policies in combination with either 
high or low labor standards and low employment protection/active labor market policies again in 
combination with either high or low labor standards. It emerges that negative employment 
minimum wage effects are strongest for the group of countries having the least regulation, 
namely Canada, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom.    6
Theoretical Backdrop and Econometric Specification 
  The theoretical model in this paper is implicit. It is in the spirit of Cahuc and Zylberberg 
(1999) and Coe and Snower (1997).
8 Cahuc and Zylberberg offer a dynamic search and matching 
model with wage negotiations and employment protection (viz.  severance payments and 
limitations on dismissals), and introduce minimum wage setting into this framework to study its 
impact on job creation and job destruction. Their model implies that employment protection may 
strongly elevate unemployment of lower skilled workers when the minimum wage is high but 
have little impact where the minimum wage is low (or when wages are flexible). For their part, 
Coe and Snower develop a model of policy complementarities and show that policies/institutions 
that affect the bargaining power of incumbent employees, or that influence the search behavior 
of the unemployed, or that influence barriers to job creation can have complementary effects on 
unemployment such that minimum-wage like measures that cost jobs can be magnified or 
ameliorated according to the restrictiveness of the ruling labor market environment. Both 
models, then, capture the interaction of minimum wages with labor market rigidities and labor 
force characteristics, and imply that minima will be less disruptive when policies are less rigid. 
The more obvious component of the model is the extent to which the minimum wage is 
effective. When the minimum wage is binding, the demand curve determines the level of 
employment for the given minimum wage; otherwise, equilibrium employment is a function of 
both demand and supply. We do not model the determinants of the probability that the minimum 
wage will bind (see, inter al., Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti, 2010) but rather attempt to capture 
its bite here by expressing the minimum wage as a ratio of median wage.
9 (Since the latter 
argument is only available for all workers, we supplement it with a measure of the gender gap on 
the reasoning that the larger the gap between males and females, the more likely the latter to be 
adversely impacted by hikes in the minimum wage. We also experimented with a measure of the 
disparity in female earnings, as proxied by the 90:10 percentile spread, although this measure 
was available for a reduced sample of countries. Use of the minimum to median wage ratio also 
reduces the bias arising from the correlation between minimum wage levels and macroeconomic 
events affecting minimum wage levels. 
Our econometric specification is as follows:  
                      39 , , 1 ; 16 , , 1
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               (1)   7
where Yit is alternately the female employment rate, unemployment rate, and participation rate in 
country i and time t;
10 MWit-1 is the minimum to median wage ratio; Xit and Zi are the time-
varying and time-invariant supply, demand, and institutional arguments, respectively; αi indexes 
fixed country effects and λt fixed year effects; θi captures the time trends in the outcome indicator 
for country i; and  it ε  is an error term. The data cover 16 countries and the time interval 1970 to 
2008. The time-varying arguments in the vector Xit comprise our three base regressors (the adult 
male unemployment rate, the fertility rate, and the wage gap) plus four institutional regressors 
(employment protection, union density, the UI replacement rate, and active labor market 
policies). The time-invariant arguments in the vector Zi, are all institutional: three measures 
describing the minimum wage fixing machinery (bargained versus statutorily determined, and 
presence of youth and subnational minima) along with a labor standards index. The institutional 
components of the vectors Xit and Zi are also interacted with the lagged minimum wage measure.  
  OLS and fixed effect versions of equation (1) were run. Additionally, we estimated our 
preferred dynamic version of the model by including the relevant lagged dependent variable as a 
regressor. We used the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1981) to estimate the dynamic model. 
  
Data 
The data used in this inquiry are gathered from OECD online databases and published 
resources, and from the CEP-OECD Institutions Data Set (Nickell, 2006). The data in question 
cover employment to population ratios, unemployment rates, labor force participation rates, adult 
male unemployment rates (as a business cycle control), minimum wages and minimum wage 
rules, measures of labor market rigidity, the gender wage gap, and the fertility rate. OECD data 
on minimum wages are available where a national minimum wage is set by statute or by a 
national collective bargaining agreement. For countries where no national minimum exists, but 
where industry- or occupation-specific minima are set by legislation or collective bargaining 
agreements, we use summary estimates constructed by Dolado et al. (1996) as our base measure, 
following Neumark and Washer (2004).
11 These estimates relate the minimum wage to average 
wages whereas the corresponding OECD values are based on the minimum to median wage 
ratio. 
(Table 1 near here)   8
Most OECD countries have some sort of minimum wage policy. Table 1 provides 
information on these minima, as well as the machinery of minimum wage determination, for 
those countries for which we have been able to assemble consistent data on all variables. As is 
immediately evident, the countries differ not only in terms of the relative level of minimum 
wages – and hence in the potential bite of minimum wages – but also in rule setting. The first 
two columns of the table give the relative values of the minimum wage at two points in time, 
namely 1970 and 2008 (unless otherwise stated). For most countries, minimum wage to median 
wage ratios declined through time; the principal exceptions being France and the United 
Kingdom. European countries generally have higher relative values of the minimum wage than 
their non-European counterparts, including the United States. This empirical regularity has of 
course been noted in the wider literature and, taken in conjunction with the greater degree of 
labor market regulation obtaining in Europe, cited as a principal cause of that region’s high 
unemployment rates (e.g. Siebert, 1997) 
The last three columns of Table 1 summarize the minimum wage rules. The first indicates 
how minimum wages are determined. Here ‘yes’ signifies that the minimum wage is negotiated; 
that is, set via bipartite or tripartite negotiations; ‘no’ signifies the wage is set by statute. For the 
United Kingdom we observe a switch in regimes from bargained (wages councils) to statutory 
over the sample period.  The fourth column shows whether the minimum wage is national in 
scope or instead varies across industries or regions; for example, in Japan, the minimum wage 
varies across prefectures, whereas in the United States each state can set its own minimum 
exceeding the national.
12 For our sample of countries, regional and industry variation is more 
common than a unified national minimum. The final column of the table indicates whether there 
are any subminimum wages for younger persons and, if so, the age at which they apply. Some 
countries are difficult to classify in this regard and we were ultimately guided by Neumark and 
Wascher (2004:234) in treating France, Germany, Italy, and the United States as having no youth 
subminima.   
(Table 2a near here) 
There are also significant cross-country differences in the extent of labor market 
regulation, socio-demographics, and labor market activity, as charted in Tables 2a and 2b. 
Beginning with the outcome indicators in Table 2a, although the observed changes in female 
labor force participation rates are consistent with the general worldwide trend (increasing in all   9
of the countries over the thirty-nine year period), participation rates vary sometimes quite 
considerably. Thus, at any point in time, Italy, and Spain have significantly lower participation 
rates when compared with other countries, and especially the Nordic nations of Finland, 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Participation rates are one of the key margins investigated in the 
present treatment because minimum wages, and other rigidities, may inhibit the low productivity 
workers either from entering the market in the first place or actively seeking employment once 
unemployed. 
(Table 2a near here) 
Employment to population ratios rose significantly in all countries other than Sweden and 
Finland, where the observed changes were modest. Although employment rates do vary 
markedly across countries – from just 40.3 percent in Spain to 80.6 percent in Sweden – it is 
unemployment rates that show the greatest variance over the sample period. Even if by the early 
2000s unemployment rates were close to their 1980 values, most European countries experienced 
very high unemployment in the intervening years. And the female unemployment rate actually 
rose from 1.7 percent in 1970 to 6.6 percent in 2009.  
In general, fertility rates declined significantly over the sample period; the exceptions 
were Norway, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden. In the 1980s the fertility rate 
averaged 2.5 children per woman cross all OECD countries. By 2004 this average had declined 
to 1.8 children (and was even as low as 1.6 children during the late 1990s). Child birth is the 
main reason for interruptions in a woman’s work life and caring for young children either keeps 
women off the market or directs them to careers that permit flexibility to balance work and 
family. Such interruptions and career choices imply lower wages for women vis-à-vis men of the 
same age and education.  
The wage gap given in the last column of Table 2a is the difference between median male 
and female wages expressed as a percentage of the median male wage. This variable was 
included to capture the existence of gender differences in occupational choice and education that 
might be expected to affect the bite of minimum wages in the case of females. Historically, 
females have had lower rates of labor market attachment and have tended to concentrate in 
lower-paying occupations, both of which tendencies make them susceptible to minimum wage-
induced disemployment. As can be seen from the table, the wage gap averaged 22.5 percent over 
the period, ranging from 12.2 percent in Belgium to 37.9 percent in Japan.
13    10
(Table 2b near here) 
Finally, there are striking differences in the labor market conditions and institutions of 
countries in the data, which can potentially shape the manner and the intensity with which 
minimum wages affect the outcome indicators. Thus, for example, one can easily see that the 
employment effects of minimum wages might be amplified if the country in question places 
restrictions on hours adjustment or on the overall remuneration package offered to employees, 
thereby making contracts less flexible. However, if there are also institutions in place that help 
the unemployed locate jobs, the frictions resulting from the impedimenta of minimum wage 
changes may be considerably attenuated. For these reasons, we include in the model measures of 
labor standards, of the strictness of employment protection laws, of the extent of active labor 
market policies, the generosity of UI replacement rates, and the degree of unionization rates. 




Basic Regression Results 
Our initial cet. par. results are provided in Table 3 for our three outcome indicators: the 
adult female employment to population ratio, the adult female unemployment rate and the adult 
female labor force participation rate. Three sets of results are provided for each indicator: OLS, 
fixed effects, and finally Generalized Method of Moments to estimate the dynamic version of the 
model(s).  
(Table 3 near here) 
Beginning with the findings for the employment to population ratio, the results in the first 
column are for a specification that excludes fixed country effects but otherwise accounts for 
fixed year effects and country trends. The point estimate for the lagged minimum wage variable 
for this OLS specification indicates a well-determined disemployment effect of the minimum 
wage variable. The estimated elasticity – computed as the coefficient on the minimum wage 
variable plus each of the coefficients on the interaction terms – reported later in the table 
indicates that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage variable is associated with a 4.6 
percent fall in female employment. This is of course a strong estimate for developed nations.  
With respect to independent effect of the remaining regressors, the coefficient estimate 
for the adult male unemployment rate (our proxy for demand conditions) is negatively related to   11
female employment.  The estimated effect of the wage gap variable is also negative, indicating 
that female employment rates are lower, the lower female relative wages; rather more 
importantly, however, in interaction with minimum wages, a greater wage gap in favor of males 
appears to be an indicator of the bite of minimum wages. That said, in neither case are the 
coefficient estimates statistically significant. Finally, and again as expected, greater family size 
by itself is associated with reduced employment, although on this occasion the interaction term is 
positive and also well determined perhaps suggesting that the effects of family size may be 
different among minimum wage earners and among those earning close to the minimum wage. 
Introducing fixed country effects in the fixed effects specification, given in second 
column of the table, materially influences the size of the coefficient estimate for the minimum 
wave variable, more than halving its absolute magnitude and suggesting that a sizable part of the 
effect obtained earlier reflects country-specific factors. Note, too, that the much-reduced 
estimated elasticity is on this occasion no longer statistically significant. The Hausman test 
strongly rejects the null that the fixed country effects can be omitted from the specification. The 
coefficient estimates for adult male unemployment and the wage gap are little altered vis-à-vis 
the OLS specification in the first column, but note that the interaction term with the minimum 
wage measure is now statistically significant giving further credence to the wage-bite argument. 
Fertility rates are no longer statistically significant either independently or in interaction with 
minimum wages. 
Finally, the GMM estimates in the third column serve to further reduce the point estimate 
of the minimum wage variable and the absolute value of the computed elasticity which, however, 
regains its statistical significance. Among other findings from the dynamic model are of course 
the highly significant coefficient estimate for the lagged dependent variable, and the demand 
variable (the adult male unemployment rate). The wage gap coefficients estimates are reduced in 
absolute magnitude and while statistically significant are now only marginally so. As in the fixed 
effects specification, fertility is nowhere statically significant. Recall that the inclusion of the 
lagged employment rate can also be interpreted as helping to distinguish between the short-run 
and long-run effects of the minimum wage on employment. On these estimates, -0.056 is the 
short-run coefficient and -0.179 (=.056/(1 - .687)) is the long-run coefficient. 
The results in the next three columns of the table switch to the unemployment outcome. 
We expect less from these regressions since unemployment is not the inevitable consequence of   12
disemployment; reduced labor force participation (see below) being an obvious alternative. 
These expectations are not borne out in our preferred specification, however, where the positive 
minimum wage coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Not surprisingly, the 
inverse demand indicator (now a subcomponent if the dependent variable) is positively 
associated with female unemployment. More interestingly, the wage gap in interaction with the 
minimum wage arguments is positively associated with female unemployment in both the fixed 
effect and GMM specifications. 
The participation rate equations shown in the last three columns of Table 3 all confirm 
that disemployment even if it is not always linked to higher unemployment appears to have a 
counterpart in lowered female labor force participation. The minimum wage elasticities with 
respect to participation are also in most cases statistically significant. The most interesting other 
result is again the performance of the wage gap variable. Although typically poorly determined 
as an independent influence, in interaction with minimum wages it again seems to suggest that 
where minimum wages bite most – as indexed by a higher wage gap – the negative effects on 
participation are strongest. The coefficient estimates for this interaction term are negative 
throughout, and statistically significant in the fixed effects and GMM specifications. 
 
The Augmented Model 
  We now allow for differences in minimum wage systems across countries and for other 
labor market policies and institutions. As far as the minimum wage is concerned, we consider the 
method used to set minimum wages (whether it was bargained, as opposed to being statutorily 
determined), whether provision is made for a youth subminimum, and whether wage floors vary 
across regions/industries.
14  Apart from the contribution of the machinery of minimum wage 
setting, we examine the role of more encompassing employment protection, higher labor 
standards, and greater union density, as well as more generous UI systems and more 
comprehensive active labor market policies. Note that with the exception of the labor standards 
argument all of these variables are time varying rather than fixed as in Neumark and Wascher.  
(Table 4 near here) 
  Results of the augmented model are given in Table 4. Beginning with the key 
employment dependent variable, the OLS results suggest that bargained minimum wages as 
opposed to statutorily-determined minima do not facilitate female employment. Although the   13
independent effect of bargained minima is positive, the interaction term is negative and larger in 
absolute magnitude. Whatever the supposed flexibility introduced by such minimum wage 
systems for other groups of workers, this decidedly does not carry over to adult females; if 
anything, any such effect is generated by the presence of subnational minimum rates. 
Unexpectedly, the presence of a youth minimum in conjunction with the minimum wage 
argument is associated with significantly higher female employment rates. As far as the other 
institutions are concerned, more generous employment protection (though not higher union 
density or labor standards) is seemingly independently injurious to adult female employment but 
in association with the minimum wage argument appears not just to soften but overturn such 
implied employment losses. On the other hand, taken in conjunction with the minimum wage, 
higher labor standards are associated with disemployment. It is hard to detect any beneficial 
independent impact of the other two policies. Finally, the performance of the basic arguments 
examined earlier is largely strengthened. Most notably, in interaction with the minimum wage 
argument, the adverse role of the wage gap is strengthened. 
Our preferred estimates are to be found in the next two columns of the table.  The 
independent influences of employment protection, union density, and the UI replacement rate are 
all negative but with the exception of the latter generally not statistically significant, while the 
directional influence of the basic variables is confirmed. More noteworthy is the strengthening of 
the coefficient estimate for the minimum wage argument, on which more below. The interactions 
of the minimum wage argument with the wage gap and the labor market institutions/policies are 
also of interest. The former association is again strong and strengthens for the GMM 
specification (compare Table 3); the results again suggesting that the lower the female relative 
wage, the bigger the bite of the minimum wage. As far as the institutions are concerned, observe 
that in both cases more embracing employment protection is associated with higher female rates 
but in neither case is the coefficient estimate statistically significant. For their part, higher labor 
standards still act as a drag on female employment. Although union density is still nowhere 
statistically significant, the effects of more generous UI replacement rates are now positive and 
well determined. And active labor market policies gain traction. The benefits for adult female 
employment rates of a youth subminimum are seemingly not an artifact of the data and the 
seeming detriment of a bargained minimum wage is underscored. For both specifications, the 
presence of different wage floors by industry and region seems to reduce the sting of minimum   14
wages. But of all the findings, most notable is the strengthening of the estimated elasticity of 
female employment to the minimum wage. The estimates range from -0.689 in the first column 
of the table through -0.209 in the second column to -0.174 in the third column. Each exceeds in 
absolute magnitude the estimates earlier reported in Table 3. 
Turning next to the unemployment results, it can be seen that the point estimates for the 
lagged minimum to median wage ratio argument are nowhere statistically significant. Focusing 
on the interaction terms, therefore, the findings for the institutional arguments are with the 
exception of labor standards broadly consistent with the employment results (i.e. mostly 
producing sign reversals). This is most notably the case for those variables indexing differences 
in minimum wage systems and employment protection. Interestingly, there is no suggestion that 
more generous UI replacement rates increase unemployment or that active labor market policies 
reduce it.  
Next consider the results for female labor force participation rates contained in the last 
three columns of Table 4. These in many cases simply parallel the results for employment rates. 
Thus, the strong effects of minimum wages on participation match those for employment while 
help explaining the ambiguous results for unemployment. Again note that, in conjunction with 
the minimum wage argument, a youth subminimum, wage floors that vary across industries or 
regions (in the GMM specification), and more generous unemployment benefits (again in the 
GMM specification) seem to advance female participation, while a bargained minimum wage, a 
greater wage gap, and higher labor standards detract from participation.   
(Table 5 near here) 
  As a final exercise, we investigate differences in minimum wage effects across countries. 
The individual country minimum wage elasticities are reported in Table 5. The estimates in 
question are based on the GMM specifications given in the third, sixth, and ninth columns of 
Table 4. The elasticities are calculated as the coefficient on the minimum wage variable plus 
each of the coefficients on the interaction terms multiplied by the minimum wage rule dummies 
and the standardized values of the policy variables/wage gap/fertility rates for that country. Each 
country elasticity estimate is statistically significant at conventional levels.
15   
  The minimum wage elasticities with respect to employment range from -0.055 in the case 
of the Netherlands to -0.420 for Italy. The corresponding range for the minimum wage 
participation elasticity is -0.056 (for Ireland) to -0.339 (Italy). These results imply material   15
disemployment effects and they are not confined to employment and participation. That said, the 
minimum wage unemployment elasticities are smaller in absolute terms, although with one 
exception they are positive and in almost all cases statistically significant. In other words, 
minimum wages also spill over into female unemployment. To our knowledge these are the 
strongest and most consistent indications of the adverse consequences of minimum wages for 
adult females to have been reported in the literature. 
(Tables 6 and 7 near here) 
The next issue concerns combinations of policies. As we have seen, Neumark and 
Wascher (2004: 242-3) were able to detect certain patterns in the data; most notable of which 
was their finding that the disemployment effects of minimum wages were strongest in those 
countries (Canada, Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom) with the least regulated 
markets. In our framework of time-varying regressors, identification of individual countries with 
set regimes is not straightforward. We first followed Neumark and Wascher’s methodology and 
grouped our countries with respect to degree of market regulation using an average value for the 
policy indicators and by creating a joint ranking for employment protection and active labor 
market policies. As is evident from Table 6, we cannot replicate their results for prime-age 
females. Indeed, if anything, the suggestion is the least regulated markets produce the best 
outcomes for women.   
However, it is manifestly the case that the patterns are by no means consistent for all 
countries in these groups, pointing to the role of other factors in explaining the differences.  
Moreover, with our time-varying regressors, countries move in their rankings over the years, 
making it hard to characterize countries as populating a unique cluster. In Table 7, therefore, we 
allow each country to be classified by its yearly status by policy dimension.  We can see from 
this table that in highly regulated countries, especially in circumstances where the wage gap is 
high (where women are less productive or concentrated in low-paying industries) , and where 
fertility rates are also high (implying lesser job experience) minimum wages have the highest 
collateral damage to female employment and participation. In short, policy parameters alone 
cannot explain elasticities in a cohesive manner. Other country characteristics play a more 
crucial role in explaining female labor market activity.  
The bottom line is that despite the results of our regression analysis sharing a key   
commonality with the study of Neumark and Wascher, there is little evidence of similar patterns   16
of elasticities in our data. This is not unexpected given the time-varying nature of our regressors 
and the different demographic group studied.    
 
Concluding Remarks 
This is one of only a handful of studies to have investigated the sensitivity of female 
employment to the minimum wage and almost the only one to exploit a pooled cross-section 
time-series data set. Our study was motivated in no small part by Neumark and Wascher’s 
seminal study of the sensitivity of teenage and youth unemployment to minimum wages, the 
innovation here residing in their analysis of a cross-country panel of data rather than the target 
group selected.  In this regard we were also struck by the authors’ caveat that, by using the adult 
minimum wage in constructing the minimum wage ratio, they had “overstated the relevant (or 
‘effective’) minimum wage for the age groups under study ...” (Hence their use of a youth 
subminimum in their first set of extended regressions.).  In our study, use of the adult minimum 
wage raises no such difficulties of interpretation; although our understanding of minimum wage 
effects is enhanced by the inclusion of a gender wage gap argument. And indeed we found 
consistent evidence that increases in minimum wages translated into lower female employment 
and participation rates, even if the unemployment results were not transparent in this regard. On 
the other hand, we were frankly surprised by the failure of the presence of youth subminima to 
strengthen the minimum wage effect. Seemingly, if Neumark and Wascher’s results carry over to 
female teenagers and youth in the present data set, such groups would be adjudged gross 
complements with adult females. However, another possibility is of course that the substitution 
possibilities are poorly proxied by this argument.  
There were also some interesting commonalities having to do with the role of labor 
standards and to a lesser extent UI replacement rates. Yet the dominant result of the present 
inquiry is and remains the finding of consistent disemployment effects of the minimum wages 
for adult females. Our preferred estimates of the elasticity of the employment-to-population ratio 
with respect to the minimum wage ranged from -0.051 to -0.103 in the basic model and from -
0.174 to -0.209 in the augmented model. 
Finally, our data do not permit such a tidy pattern or configuration of nations as reported 
by Neumark and Wascher for youths and teenagers of both genders. We do not find any obvious   17
alignment of labor market institutions and policies. If anything, the institutional patterns we 
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Endnotes 
1. This is an oversimplification to the extent that the existence of a minimum wage is sometimes 
present in the employment protection literature, where it is aggregated in a general measure of 
labor market (in)flexibility. 
2. We also considered the role of other labor market institutional and policy variables such as the 
tax wedge and the degree of coordination in collective bargaining, as well as some other 
mainstream arguments such as the output-gap. These proved mostly statistically insignificant and 
are not further discussed here. 
3. Although for meta-analyses, see Card and Kruger (1995); Boockmann (2010).  
4. Note that the OECD study ranges further afield to investigate the impact of minimum wages 
on poverty and the income distribution and on wages and the wage distribution. 
5. Among teenagers, female elasticities always exceeded those of males but no such gender 
pattern obtained in the cases of youths and adults. 
6. Coe and Snower (1997), provide the theoretical basis for expecting complementarities 
between the various labor market policies, to include the minimum wage. 
7. The authors exclude from these regressions the other institutional arrangements concerning the 
mechanics of minimum wage setting considered earlier. 
8. See also Kahn (2010). 
9. On the superiority of the minimum wage as a ratio of the median vis-à-vis the average wage in 
international comparisons, see OECD (1998: 38). 
10. We also examined average hours worked, although female hours were available for only 
eight countries, a much reduced sample. 
11. We are indebted to David Neumark and William Wascher for supplying us with the data they 
used in their 2004 study, some of which is used here. 
12. The ‘new minimum wage research’ in the United States has used this geographic variation to 
help identify employment effects, albeit in quite different ways (cf. Neumark and Wascher 1992; 
Card and Krueger 1994).   
13. We also included a wage measure that captures the distribution of female wages, namely the 
difference between the 90
th and 10
th percentile of the female wage distribution. The results are 
entirely consistent with those reported for the minimum wage and are available from the authors 
upon request.   19
14. As noted by Neumark and Wascher (2004: note 18), the classification of minimum wage 
systems is inevitably open to some discretion, especially with respect to youth subminima. We 
follow their convention in treating the cases of Italy, France, Germany and the United States, 
where there is some such limited wage differentiation as having no such differentiation. On the 
broader question of Germany, where the differentiation stems from its famous apprenticeship 
system, there is of course the very much wider issue of whether that nation is properly classified 
as having minimum wages at all – at least prior to the recent posted workers act and latterly the 
introduction of minima for individual sectors such waste disposal. As a practical matter, the 
exclusion of Germany did not materially affect any of the major findings reported below or 
earlier; full results are available from the authors upon request. 
15. We also estimated the corresponding minimum wage elasticities for the fixed effect 
specifications given in the second, fifth, and eighth columns of Table 4. The elasticities were 
somewhat larger than those reported in Table 5 and all were well determined. The results are 








Table 1.  Minimum Wage Levels and Rules 
 
Minimum to Median 





Observation   
Bargained Minimum Wage  
 
Presence of Subnational 
Minimum Wages 
 
Presence of Youth 
Subminimum 
Australia 0.65  (1985)  0.52    no     no     yes <21 
Belgium 0.54  (1975)  0.50    yes     no     yes <21 
Canada 0.48  0.41    no     yes Province    no  
Denmark 0.55  0.54  (1994)    yes     yes Industry    yes <18 
Finland  0.52 (1993)  0.52 (1993)    yes     yes Industry    yes <18 
France 0.42  0.62    no     no     no limited 
Germany 0.57  0.58  (1994)    yes     yes Industry    no some 
Ireland 0.67  (2000)  0.52    no     no     yes <18 
Italy  0.78 (1976)  0.71 (1991)    yes     yes Industry    no some 
Japan 0.78  (1975)  0.34    no     yes Prefecture    no  
Netherlands 0.58  0.42    no     no     yes <23 
New Zealand  0.60  0.59    no     no     yes <20 
Spain 0.70  0.44    no     no     yes <18 
Sweden 0.53  (1975)  0.51    yes     yes Industry    yes <24 
United Kingdom  0.365  0.46    yes/no  Wages Councils  (up to 1993); 
Statute (after 1999)   
yes /no  Industry 
 
yes <21 
United States  0.49  0.34    no     yes State    no Limited 
Note: First and last observations of minimum to median wage ratio are for 1970 and 2008, respectively, unless otherwise noted.   
Sources: Minimum to median wage ratios are obtained from OECD online database for all countries and years except for Denmark, Germany, Italy, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom (before 1993).  For these countries, we use summary estimates constructed by Dolado et al. (1996) as our base measure following 




Table 2a. Means (and Standard Deviations) of the Labor Market Outcomes and Gender Variables 
 
Country  Employment to 
Population Ratio 
Labor Force 
Participation Rate  Unemployment Fertility  Wage  Gap 
Australia  0.586 (0.094)  0.619 (0.101)  0.052 (0.015)  1.969 (0.295)  0.170 (0.026) 
Belgium  0.609 (0.087)  0.678 (0.077)  0.104 (0.031)  1.709 (0.17)  0.122 (0.031) 
Canada  0.672 (0.087)  0.726 (0.088)  0.075 (0.015)  1.679 (0.174)  0.271 (0.129) 
Denmark  0.792 (0.023)  0.848 (0.018)  0.066 (0.021)  1.719 (0.171)  0.132 (0.012) 
Finland  0.785 (0.040)  0.831 (0.042)  0.055 (0.035)  1.727 (0.086)  0.227 (0.026) 
France  0.643 (0.076)  0.705 (0.098)  0.084 (0.033)  1.903 (0.203)  0.164 (0.058) 
Germany  0.611 (0.091)  0.657 (0.112)  0.066 (0.027)  1.442 (0.163)  0.252 (0.022) 
Ireland  0.469 (0.162)  0.509 (0.161)  0.084 (0.051)  2.523 (0.702)  0.19 (0.045) 
Italy  0.444 (0.097)  0.490 (0.117)  0.088 (0.039)  1.561 (0.394)  0.166 (0.011) 
Japan  0.603 (0.050)  0.621 (0.058)  0.028 (0.012)  1.619 (0.272)  0.379 (0.038) 
Netherlands  0.518 (0.184)  0.548 (0.193)  0.054 (0.033)  1.682 (0.223)  0.237 (0.046) 
New Zealand  0.691 (0.036)  0.726 (0.031)  0.048 (0.014)  2.152 (0.330)  0.162 (0.069) 
Spain  0.403 (0.131)  0.479 (0.164)  0.145 (0.085)  1.765 90.630)  0.231 (0.060) 
Sweden  0.806 (0.066)  0.836 (0.072)  0.036 (0.022)  1.778 (0.174)  0.172 (0.019) 
United Kingdom  0.701 (0.045)  0.742 (0.033)  0.057 (0.021)  1.829 (0.175)  0.307 (0.075) 
United States  0.653 (0.088)  0.688 (0.089)  0.052 (0.012)  1.968 (0.149)  0.287 (0.07) 
Total  0.619 (0.152)  0.664 (0.156)  0.068 (0.044)  1.814 (0.40)     0.225 (0.090) 
correlation with the 
lagged minimum wage 
measure 
0.042 0.155 0.508 0.773 -0.716 
Sources: The labor market indicators are taken from the OECD.Stat online data base.  Fertility rates are from the OECD Family 
data base.  The wage gap is the difference between median male and female wages expressed as a percentage of the male median 
wage.  This variable is generated using OECD data. The mean wage ratio is used instead for the Netherlands, downloaded from 







Table 2b.  Means (and Standard Deviations) of the Labor Market Institutions and Policy Variables 
 









Australia  3.0  0.335 (0.048)  5.685 (0.667)  5.468 (9.443)  23.123 (3.368) 
Belgium  2.0  0.955 (0.159)  15.037 (1.924) 12.872  (23.231) 42.453  (2.556) 
Canada  1.0  0.27 (0.0)  6.026 (0.369)  7.381 (13.205)  17.575 (2.339) 
Denmark  2.0  0.655 (0.146)  24.579 (6.306)  25.96 (34.846)  50.105 (8.053) 
Finland  3.0  0.733 (0.043)  15.407 (5.129)  17.986 (32.488)  30.98 (7.488) 
France  3.0  0.929 (0.105)  10.038 (1.48)  2.318 (4.07)  33.823 (6.257) 
Germany  4.0  0.970 (0.128)  18.76 (4.02)  5.37 (9.493)  28.45 (1.101) 
Ireland  2.0  0.297 (0.052)  16.336 (6.526) 13.476  (17.99) 29.098  (6.312) 
Italy  3.0  1.0495 (0.235)  11.11 (0.533)  7.949 (14.138)  13.195 (14.448) 
Japan  1.0  0.677 (0.049)  4.787 (1.120)  4.683 (8.306)  9.9875 (1.793) 
Netherlands  4.0  0.845 (0.090)  30.64 (12.361)  5.197 (9.212)  51.318 (2.803) 
New Zealand  3.0  0.350 (0.088)  11.694 (2.849)  5.249 (9.226)  29.013 (1.814) 
Spain  3.0  1.184 (0.141)  4.105 (1.222)  3.241 (5.853)  30.165 (8.196) 
Sweden  5.0  0.889 (0.268)  48.715 (19.133)  18.185 (32.658)  23.855 (6.379) 
United Kingdom  0.0  0.202 (0.022)  7.582 (1.484)  7.155 (12.564)  19.855 (3.361) 
United States  0.0  0.070 (0.000)  3.587 (0.349)  2.949 (5.17)  12.86 (1.301) 
Total  2.434 (1.37)  0.651 (0.359)  14.63 (13.15)  9.09 (19.02)  27.87 (13.32) 
correlation with the lagged 
minimum wage measure  0.658 -0.119 0.436 0.031 0.711 
Sources:  The labor standards index is as described by Neumark and Wascher (2004: 237). It refers to the situation as of 1993 and is 
taken from the OECD Jobs Study (1994) and specifically excludes the contributions of minimum wages and employment protection 
policies. The employment protection variable is taken from Nickell (2006) and is the employment protection legislation data from the 
OECD.Stat using Version 1of that indicator: the strictness of employment protection legislation. Nickell (2006) extends this data 
using Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). These data are available only until 2004, with 2004 values being used for later years. The union 
density measure is again taken from Nickell (2006) and is calculated as union membership divided by employment, using 
administrative and survey data from the OECD labor market statistics data base. This base measure is then extended by splicing in 
data from Visser (2006). These data are available only until 2004, with 2004 values being used for later years. The unemployment 
insurance replacement rate is the original benefit replacement rate data published by the OECD. These data are also available only 
until 2004, with 2004 values again being used for later years. The active labor market policies variable is taken from Nickell (2006). 
It is calculated as expenditures divided by the unemployment rate. These data are available only until 2004; missing values are now 
interpolated using unemployment and GDP measures. All variables are standardized for the regressions.   23
 
Table 3. Estimates of the Standard Minimum Wage Model Using International Data 
 
Adult Female Employment to 
Population Ratio   
Adult Female Unemployment 
Rate   
Adult Female Labor Force 
Participation Rate (LFPR)  Variable 
OLS FE GMM    OLS  FE  GMM    OLS FE  GMM 
Lagged Adult Female Employment      0.687***                 
     (0.067)                 
Lagged Adult Female Unemployment Rate              0.652***         
            (0.099)        
Lagged Adult Female LFPR                      0.708*** 
                     (0.064) 
Lagged Minimum to Median Wage Ratio   -0.277***  -0.107***  -0.056***   -0.025  0.034  0.035**  -0.311*** -0.099** -0.035** 
 (0.067)  (0.033)  (0.021)    (0.023)  (0.035)  (0.014)    (0.068)  (0.041)  (0.017) 
Adult Male Unemployment Rate  -0.609***  -0.641***  -0.358***  0.749*** 0.701***  0.407***    -0.148  -0.208  -0.101* 
 (0.178)  (0.112)  (0.047)    (0.078)  (0.069)  (0.085)    (0.182)  (0.140)  (0.060) 
Wage Gap  -0.018  0.075***  0.02**    -0.008  -0.02**  -0.014*    -0.023  0.076***  0.014 
 (0.022)  (0.016)  (0.008)    (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.007)    (0.022)  (0.018)  (0.009) 
Fertility Rate  -0.582***  0.016  0.01    -0.129*** -0.029  -0.016   -0.668***  0.011  0.001 
 (0.093)  (0.031)  (0.014)    (0.038)  (0.044)  (0.012)    (0.097)  (0.036)  (0.014) 
Lagged Minimum to Median Wage Ratio interacted with:              
Wage Gap  -0.069  -0.167***  -0.041**    0.016  0.043* 0.024*   -0.065 -0.169** -0.032* 
 (0.055)  (0.036)  (0.017)    (0.017)  (0.022)  (0.014)    (0.055)  (0.043)  (0.017) 
Fertility Rate  1.33***  0.036  -0.017    0.125  -0.024  0.013    1.437***  -0.01  -0.013 
   (0.173)  (0.074)  (0.036)     (0.072)
+ (0.079) (0.032)     (0.186)  (0.088)  (0.033) 
Constant 0.64***  0.409***  0.153***    0.093***  0.038**  0.003    0.696***  0.423***  0.141*** 
  (0.039)  (0.021)  (0.025)     (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.012)     (0.039)  (0.026)  (0.023) 
Minimum Wage Elasticity  -0.455**  -0.103  -0.051***    -0.043** 0.035*  0.032***   -0.504**  -0.089 -0.031*** 
   (0.219)  (0.071)  (0.018)     (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.010)     (0.237)  (0.071)  (0.013) 
Country  Fixed  Effects  NO  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES   NO  YES  YES 
Year Fixed Effects  YES  YES  YES   YES  YES  YES   YES  YES  YES 
Country Specific Time Trends  YES  YES  YES     YES  YES  YES     YES  YES  YES 
Observations 340  340  319    340  340  319    340  340  319 
R-squared 0.889  0.985      0.881  0.886      0.881  0.985   
Number of Countries     16  14        16  14        16  14 
Hausman / Sargan tests (p-values)  0.000  0.000  1.000     0.000  0.016  1.000     0.000  0.000  1.000 
Notes: Hubert-White robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. The STATA xtreg command reports a constant for the fixed effects regressions: It is the mean of all 
country-specific effects. The Hausman specification test is for the exclusion of year and country controls in the first two specifications. The Sargan test indicates whether the 
over-identifying restrictions should be excluded in the GMM regression. Exclusion of these regressors is rejected at 0.01level. We also use the Hausman test to determine 
whether the assumption of no correlation between the error terms and the independent variables is correct.  As this restriction is rejected in all specifications, we only report the 
fixed effects regression results.   
*Statistically significant at the .10 level, ** at the .05 level, *** at the .01 level.   24









Table 4: Estimates of the Augmented Minimum Wage Model with Characteristics of Minimum Wage Systems and Other Labor Market  Policies and Institutions 
 
     
Variable 
Adult Female Employment to 
Population Ratio    Adult Female Unemployment Rate   
Adult Female Labor Force 
Participation Rate (LFPR) 
    OLS  FE GMM    OLS  FE GMM    OLS  FE GMM 
Lagged Adult Female Employment      0.638***                 
     (0.067)               
Lagged Adult Female Unemployment Rate              0.564***         
            (0.082)        
Lagged Adult Female LFPR                      0.68*** 
                   ( 0 . 0 6 )  
Lagged Minimum to Median Wage Ratio   -0.838***  -0.271**  -0.249***    -0.044 -0.096 0.04    -0.917***  -0.344**  -0.204*** 
  (0.183) (0.120) (0.046)    (0.076) (0.084)  (0.035)    (0.185) (0.120)  (0.056) 
Adult Male Unemployment Rate  -0.811***  -0.535***  -0.359***    0.806*** 0.635***  0.425***    -0.367***  -0.157  -0.109 
  (0.121) (0.103) (0.045)    (0.077) (0.087)  (0.082)    (0.108) (0.148)  (0.071) 
Wage Gap  -0.007  0.062**  0.028***    0.063*** 0.009  -0.01   0.029  0.079**  0.023* 
  (0.030) (0.024) (0.010)    (0.016) (0.024)  (0.009)    (0.030) (0.033)  (0.014) 
Fertility Rate  -0.151***  -0.051  -0.032*    -0.114*** 0.008  0.009    -0.19*** -0.035  -0.024 
  (0.056) (0.046) (0.017)    (0.031) (0.034)  (0.015)    (0.055) (0.038)  (0.015) 
Dummy-Bargained Minimum Wage  0.309***  0.217**      -0.14*** -0.102      0.266*** 0.169*   
 (0.063)  (0.083)      (0.032) (0.075)      (0.065) (0.095)   
Dummy-Youth Subminimum  -0.388***        0.063       -0.404***    
 (0.109)        (0.047)       (0.108)    
Dummy-Subnational Minimum  0.085        -0.024       0.123    
 (0.113)        (0.059)       (0.112)    
Employment Protection  Index  -0.183***  -0.052  -0.034    0.046*** 0.046  0.027*    -0.18*** -0.051  -0.03 
  (0.029) (0.056) (0.025)    (0.018) (0.050)  (0.014)    (0.029) (0.069)  (0.023) 
Union Density  0.03  -0.023  -0.003    0.031** 0.031  0.004    0.059** 0.007  0.000 
  (0.028) (0.022) (0.007)    (0.012) (0.020)  (0.009)    (0.025) (0.022)  (0.011) 
Unemployment Insurance Replacement Rate 0.015  -0.106**  -0.076***    0.064*** 0.04  0.026***    0.07*  -0.049  -0.048*** 
  (0.037) (0.043) (0.016)    (0.019) (0.027)  (0.007)    (0.036) (0.042)  (0.012) 
Active Labor Market Policies  -0.001  0.000  -0.01    -0.015 -0.012 0.002    -0.018 -0.016 -0.01 
  (0.023) (0.018) (0.006)    (0.013) (0.009)  (0.005)    (0.021) (0.019)  (0.009) 
Labor Standards Index  0.332***        0.052**       0.398***    
   (0.045)        (0.024)         (0.043)      25
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Lagged Minimum to Median Wage Ratio interacted with:        
Wage Gap  -0.119**  -0.134**  -0.059**    -0.118*** -0.028  0.013    -0.195***  -0.179** -0.053* 
  (0.060)  (0.055)  (0.023)  (0.033)  (0.051)  (0.021)   (0.061)  (0.078)  (0.030) 
Fertility Rate  0.367***  0.114  0.042    0.112*  -0.064  -0.03    0.383***  0.05  0.02 
  (0.111)  (0.118)  (0.042)  (0.061)  (0.071)  (0.033)   (0.112)  (0.104)  (0.037) 
Dummy-Bargained Minimum Wage  -0.589***  -0.545**  -0.383***  0.297***  0.229  0.177**  -0.484***  -0.445*  -0.277** 
  (0.138)  (0.214)  (0.107)  (0.071)  (0.183)  (0.082)   (0.144)  (0.240)  (0.131) 
Dummy-Youth Subminimum?  0.718***  0.196  0.162**    -0.107  -0.024  -0.046    0.742***  0.239  0.146** 
  (0.212)  (0.167)  (0.071)  (0.089)  (0.100)  (0.053)   (0.211)  (0.178)  (0.070) 
Dummy-Subnational Minimum?  0.209  0.41*  0.345***    -0.018  -0.048  -0.109**    0.125  0.287  0.226*** 
  (0.215)  (0.213)  (0.071)  (0.115)  (0.144)  (0.051)   (0.216)  (0.176)  (0.077) 
Employment Protection Index  0.259***  0.104  0.063    -0.063*  -0.084  -0.047*    0.258***  0.093  0.054 
  (0.058)  (0.105)  (0.045)  (0.033)  (0.098)  (0.027)   (0.058)  (0.134)  (0.042) 
Union  Density  -0.075  0.032  -0.007  -0.032 -0.045 0.004    -0.116**  -0.016 -0.006 
  (0.049)  (0.035)  (0.013)  (0.023)  (0.040)  (0.018)   (0.046)  (0.042)  (0.022) 
Unemployment Insurance Replacement Rate  -0.088 0.166**  0.139***    -0.074** -0.006  -0.019   -0.16**  0.096  0.102*** 
  (0.070)  (0.077)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.064)  (0.019)   (0.070)  (0.072)  (0.033) 
Active Labor Market Policies  0.027  0.014  0.026**    0.025  0.016  -0.007    0.058  0.041  0.024 
  (0.042)  (0.035)  (0.013)  (0.024)  (0.019)  (0.010)   (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.019) 
Labor Standards Index  -0.522***  -0.055  -0.088*    -0.156*** -0.075  -0.003    -0.675*** -0.169  -0.113* 
    (0.082)  (0.122)  (0.053)  (0.044)  (0.096)  (0.033)   (0.078)  (0.149)  (0.060) 
Constant 0.803***  0.344***  0.165***    0.11***  0.119**  0.03*    0.88***  0.411***  0.157*** 
   (0.081)  (0.056)  (0.055)  (0.034)  (0.045)  (0.016)   (0.082)  (0.055)  (0.051) 
Minimum Wage Elasticity  -0.689***  -0.209*  -0.174***    -0.029 -0.056 0.033    -0.751*** -0.260***  -0.142*** 
    (0.208)  (0.112)  (0.072)  (0.122)  (0.062)  (0.02)  (0.262)  (0.095)  (0.058) 
Country Fixed Effects  NO  YES  YES    NO YES  YES    NO YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects  YES  YES  YES    YES YES  YES    YES YES  YES 
Country Specific Time Trends  YES  YES  YES     YES  YES  YES     YES  YES  YES 
Observations 339  339  319    339 339  319    339 339  319 
R-squared 0.975  0.989     0.951 0.923     0.972 0.987   
Number of Countries     16  14        16  14        16  14 
Hausman / Sargan tests (p-values)  0.000  0.000  1.000     0.000  0.001  1.000     0.000  0.000  1.000 
Notes:  See Notes to Table 3.  
*Statistically significant at the .10 level, ** at the .05 level, *** at the .01 level.   26
 
Table 5. Minimum Wage Elasticity of Labor Market Indicators 
 
  Mean Minimum Wage Elasticity (and Standard Deviation) 
Country Employment  Unemployment  Labor Force 
Participation 
Australia    -0.206 (0.015) 0.039 (0.004)  -0.166 (0.012) 
Belgium    -0.223 (0.014) 0.084 (0.009)  -0.147 (0.013) 
Canada    -0.154 (0.016) 0.032 (0.003)  -0.127 (0.016) 
France    -0.177 (0.057) 0.012 (0.013)  -0.154 (0.045) 
Germany    -0.301 (0.011) 0.061 (0.003)  -0.276 (0.011) 
Ireland    -0.083 (0.014) 0.025 (0.002)  -0.056 (0.013) 
Italy    -0.420 (0.026) 0.077 (0.003)  -0.339 (0.019) 
Japan    -0.206 (0.003) 0.028 (0.003)  -0.167 (0.003) 
Netherlands   -0.055  (0.013)  -0.013 (0.006)  -0.067 (0.010) 
New  Zealand    -0.175 (0.022) 0.029 (0.009)  -0.145 (0.020) 
Spain    -0.146 (0.014) 0.009 (0.005)  -0.117 (0.012) 
Sweden    -0.156 (0.040) 0.000 (0.014)  -0.161 (0.032) 
United  Kingdom    -0.167 (0.080) 0.067 (0.037)  -0.110 (0.061) 
United  States    -0.170 (0.011) 0.043 (0.005)  -0.130 (0.009) 
Note: The minimum wage effects for each country are based on the indicated 
specifications in the third, sixth, and ninth columns of Table 4. They are calculated as 
the coefficient on the minimum wage variable plus each of the coefficients on the 
interaction terms multiplied by the minimum wage rule dummies and the 
standardized values of the fertility rate, wage gap, and policy variables for that 
country. Values for Finland and Denmark are not provided in this table since they are 
not included in GMM regression due to lack of sufficient observations. 
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Table 6. Elasticities By Labor Market Characteristics 
 
    
   low employment protection/low active labor market policies    high employment protection/high active labor market policies 
                            
  Canada  e_emp -0.15    United Kingdom  e_emp -0.17    Belgium  e_emp -0.22        
  (13,14)  e_unemp 0.03     (15, 14)  e_unemp 0.06     (10,4)  e_unemp 0.08        
    e_lfpr -0.13      e_lfpr -0.11      e_lfpr 0.15        
                           
  Ireland  e_emp -0.08    United States  e_emp -0.17               
  (10,10)  e_unemp 0.02      (15,16)  e_unemp 0.04               
    e_lfpr -0.05      e_lfpr -0.13               
                           
  Japan   e_emp -0.21                      





















     e_lfpr -0.17                                     
                             
  Australia   e_emp -0.21           Sweden   e_emp -0.16    Italy  e_emp -0.42 
  (4,13)  e_unemp 0.04          (1,1)  e_unemp 0.0003  (4,4)  e_unemp 0.08 
    e_lfpr -0.17            e_lfpr  -0.16    e_lfpr -0.34 
                           
  New Zealand   e_emp -0.18           France   e_emp -0.18    Netherlands  e_emp -0.06 
  (4,11)  e_unemp 0.03           (4,7)  e_unemp 0.01     (2,3)  e_unemp -0.01 
    e_lfpr -0.15             e_lfpr -0.15      e_lfpr 0.07 
                           
  Spain   e_emp -0.15           Germany   e_emp -0.3        






















   e_lfpr  -0.12          e_lfpr  -0.28       
Notes: e_emp, e_unemp, and e_lfpr are the employment, unemployment, and labor force participation elasticities with respect to the minimum wage, respectively.  
Joint rankings are created as the ranking of the sum of employment protection and active labor market policy rankings. The first ranking in parenthesis is for labor 
standards and second ranking is for the joint measure. These ranking are based on average policy values for each country, not on the yearly values.  Values for 
Finland and Denmark are not provided in this table as they are not included in the GMM regression due to lack of sufficient observations. 
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Table 7. Elasticities By Labor Market Policies and Social Characteristics 
 
      low labor standards    high labor standards 
        
    
low wage gap 
 
high wage gap 
 
low wage gap 
 
high wage gap 
e_emp  -0.098  -0.186  -0.200  -0.213 















e_lfpr  -0.072  -0.142  -0.161  -0.177 
           
e_emp  -0.113  -0.176  -0.173  -0.199 










































e_lfpr  -0.082  -0.135  -0.142  -0.169 
             
e_emp  -0.223  -0.206  -0.167  -0.161 















e_lfpr  -0.147  -0.168  -0.149  -0.152 
           
e_emp       -0.140    -0.274 











































e_lfpr             -0.138     -0.233 
Notes: e_emp, e_unemp, and e_lfpr are the employment, unemployment, and labor force participation 
elasticities with respect to the minimum wage, respectively.  In this table high and low classifications for 
each labor market policy or social characteristic are  based on yearly values, not a unique value for each 
country across the sample period but unique to each country and each year given the values of these 
characteristics. Accordingly, elasticities for one country for different years can be averaged in different cells. 
Values for Finland and Denmark are not provided in this table as they are not included in the GMM 
regression due to lack of sufficient observations.   29
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